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Abstract Under the environmental crisis of global
warming, more efforts are put in application of low carbon
energy, especially low-carbon electricity. Development of
wind generation is one potential solution to provide low-
carbon electricity source. This paper researches operation
of wind generation in a de-regulated power market. It
develops bidding models under two schemes for variable
wind generation to analyze the competition among gener-
ation companies (GENCOs) considering transmission
constraints. The proposed method employs the supply
function equilibrium (SFE) for modeling the bidding
strategy of GENCOs. The bidding process is solved as a
bi-level optimization problem. In the upper level, the profit
of an individual GENCO is maximized; while in the lower
level, the market clearing process of the independent sys-
tem operator (ISO) is modeled to minimize the production
cost. An intelligent search based on genetic algorithm and
Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) is applied to obtain the
solution. The PJM five-bus system and the IEEE 118-bus
system are used for numerical studies. The results show
when wind GENCOs play as strategic bidders to set the
price, they can make significant profit uplifts as opposed to
playing as a price taker, because the profit gain will out-
weigh the cost to cover wind uncertainty and reliability
issues. However, this may result in an increase in total
production cost and the profit of other units, which means
consumers need to pay more. Thus, it is necessary to
update the existing market architecture and structure con-
sidering these pros and cons in order to maintain a healthy
competitive market.
Keywords Low carbon, Electricity market, Game theory,
Generator bidding, Intermittency, Locational marginal
pricing
1 Introduction
For almost half century, global warming is always one of
many top challenges to human beings all over the world.
many efforts have been made to in order to avoid disasters
resulting from global warming, such as polar iceberg melt-
ing, sea level increasing, coast area recession, environment
deterioration and extremely abnormal climate etc. One
important milestone is the conclusion of ‘‘Kyoto Protocol’’
under collaborative efforts of international community in
1997 [1]. Particularly, carbon dioxide is widely believed as
one of greenhouse gas and its greenhouse effect was con-
firmed by lots of experiments. Therefore, it is natural to
advocate massive application of low-carbon energy in
electricity sector, such as wind, solar, and hydro generation
etc., in practice to alleviate carbon emission. Especially wind
generation is quickly developing in quantity and still has
huge potential to increase its total capacity. Recently, there
are several studies about future prospect and possible chal-
lenge of developing low-carbon electricity [2–6].
Over the past decades, the old vertically structured
power industry throughout the world has been gradually re-
designed for market de-regulation [7]. The generation and
transmission systems have been split into different entities
to introduce competition into the power market. The pur-
pose is to increase investment efficiency and to reduce the
cost of power supply [8].
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A variety of market operation models have been proposed
and practiced in various countries. Among all different mod-
els, the power pool market structure is the most popular one
[8–14]. This power pool is managed by a market operator or an
independent system operator (ISO) to collect the bids of
energy suppliers from generation companies (GENCOs) and
the offers of load consumers from load serving entities (LSEs).
Then, a market clearing price (MCP) is calculated as the bid
price of the most expensive supplier that is needed to com-
pletely meet the demand [10]. This market structure is built to
encourage suppliers to bid their energy price close to their
marginal cost to ensure economic efficiency. Further, to
address the transmission constraints, an economic dispatch
model is applied to minimize total generation supply cost
while satisfying the system reliability and security require-
ments. Then, the locational marginal pricing (LMP) method
[15] is usually employed to calculate the generation profit and
load payment and to manage the transmission constraints.
Therefore, to model the dispatch function of the ISO and
the individual behavior of the GENCO, it is naturally to
split the bidding process into two parts [10–12]. The first
part is the ISO market clearing process: the ISO collects all
necessary information such as bids and offers from GEN-
COs and LSEs, and then performs security constrained
economic dispatch (SCED) to set the market price. The
second step is the self-scheduling of the GENCO for their
own payoff optimization such that they can present the best
bidding strategy in the forthcoming market.
Modeling and solving bidding strategies problem has
been a hot research topic for a long time. In [9], a proba-
bility based Monte Carlo (MC) method is proposed to solve
competitive generator game with imperfect information,
but without transmission constraints. In [10], a mathemat-
ical analysis based on a Lagrangian Relaxation is proposed.
In [16], a cooperative game is analyzed with potential
coalitions and collusions of participants in electricity
markets. A prime-dual interior point iteration based on
sensitivity was developed to update bidding strategies for
GENCOs in [11]. Bidding with transmission constraint was
solved in [11–13]. Also in [12], it is shown that the fea-
sibility of Bender Decomposition to solve bidding strategy
problems in two parts. In [11], an incomplete information
case combined with transmission constraint was carried
out. A bidding strategy problem was solved by Monte
Carlo simulation and genetic algorithm (GA) in [17].
Intelligent heuristic search such as GA is also a good way
to deal with bidding strategy problems in [17, 18]. Further,
for a multi-Nash equilibrium of multiplayer games in
electricity markets, all Nash equilibria, if exist, could be
calculated based on solving polynomial equations in [19].
An analytical approach of transmission-constrained resid-
ual demand derivative is used for a power market bidding
problem solution in [20].
Strategies for wind power trading were studied in [21].
Two types of bid scenarios are proposed as linear bid and
block bid trading for wind power generation, but the model
did not consider transmission constraints and competition
with other types of generators. In [22, 23], a trading strategy
is given for wind power producers to minimize their
imbalance cost in short-term, but the transmission con-
straints as well as competition with other types of generators
are not considered. In [24], the uncertainty of wind power
generation was modeled in constraints of an optimization
problem instead of in the objective function. However, it did
not consider the wind power generation as a variable in the
objective function of the optimization problem.
The goal of this paper is to develop a bidding strategy
model for wind generation participating in the competition
with conventional generators. Here, the difference between
two types of generators is the high uncertainty of wind
generation. Thus, probabilistic approach is taken for the
bidding strategy model. Also, the transmission constraints
are considered. To solve the overall problem, a bi-level
optimization model is formulated where the upper-level
subproblem maximizes the payoffs of the GENCOs and
the lower-level subproblem solves the market clearing
problem of the ISO including economic dispatch and
pricing. The Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) method is
used to describe the wind generation statistical character-
istic, linear programming (LP) is used to solve the lower-
level subproblem, and GA is used to solve the upper-level
subproblem.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
problem formulation including the proposed wind genera-
tion bidding strategy model. Section 3 discusses the GA, a
simplified Monte Carlo method and their applications to
the solution of the proposed problem formulation. Sec-
tion 4 shows the numerical examples with the PJM 5-bus
system and the IEEE 118-bus system. Section 5 concludes
the discussion.
2 Problem formulation
In a complete information game, all players know the
bidding strategy of other players and their payoff functions.
Equilibrium is reached when no player can increase its
payoff by unilaterally changing its strategy.
Some assumptions commonly employed in bidding
strategy study are listed as follows:
1) Each GENCO has only one generator unit and bids a
constant price for a single block for simplicity, while
in practice a monotonically increasing multi-block bid
model is commonly used.
2) GENCO uses supply function equilibrium (SFE) model.
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3) Load is always inelastic and constant for simplicity
because load’s bids can be essentially modeled as
negative generation if needed.
4) Power losses on transmission lines are neglected and
the transmission limit is considered in this paper.
5) The LMPs in day-ahead market are the same as those
in the real-time market.
2.1 GENCO’s bidding strategy model
GENCOs cannot decide the price just by themselves. It
is the ISO to clear the market and determine the price.
However, GENCOs can affect the price via their bidding
strategies. Hence, the whole bidding process is a bi-level
optimization problem. The first level is that each GENCO
maximizes its own profit, and the second level is a trans-
mission constrained economic dispatch by ISO to minimize
total production cost under all security constraints.
Suppose all conventional GENCOs have a convex
quadratic production cost function as follows
Ci ¼ C Gið Þ ¼ aiG2i þ ciGi þ di ð1Þ
The marginal cost is calculated as
dCi
dGi
¼ 2aiGi þ ci ð2Þ
where ai is the generation cost coefficients of conventional
GENCO i ($/MWh2), ci is the marginal cost of conven-
tional GENCO i ($/MWh), Ci = C(Gi) is the generation
production cost function of conventional GENCO i ($), di
is the generation cost coefficients of conventional GENCO
i ($), Gi is the scheduled generation of conventional
GENCO i (MWh).
It is a linear function of its scheduled generation Gi.
Obviously, GENCOs can make their strategic bids by
changing ai and ci. For simplicity, in this paper, only ci will
be changed and also let ai equals to zero based on
assumption at the beginning of this section. Therefore, each
GENCO will submit generator bids to the ISO according to
the following linear supply function for Generator i.
fi ¼ bi  oCioGi ¼ bi  ci ð3Þ
where bi is the unknown bidding strategic coefficient var-
iable of conventional GENCO i (it equals to 1 for non-
strategic bidders), fi is the bidding price of conventional
GENCO i ($/MWh).
All of the wind GENCO shares the same description as
in (1), (2) and (3). The only difference is that we use the
subscript j for wind GENCOs, while other GENCOs use
the subscript i.
2.2 Market clearance model
Suppose the ISO uses a transmission constrained eco-
nomic dispatch to clear the market after collecting all bids
and to calculate the market price based on the locational
marginal pricing (LMP) model. If the wind power gen-
eration output is taken as a deterministic variable, the





bi  ci  Gi þ
XT
j¼Hþ1








Gi min Gi Gi max; Gj min Gj Gj max ð6Þ
Xn
l¼1
Fk l  Gl  Dlð Þ Lk for k ¼ 1; 2;    ; m ð7Þ
where Dl is the load demand at bus l (MWh), Gimin
and Gimax are the minimum and maximum generation
output of conventional GENCO i (MWh) respectively, Gl
is the generation at bus l (MWh), Fk-l the generation
shift factor to line k from bus, Lk is the transmission limit of
line k.
The control variables are bi, bj, Gi and Gj. The GENCO
production cost is minimized in (4). Constraint (5) ensures
the balance of supply and demand. Constraint (6) repre-
sents the generation capacity limit. Constraint (7) repre-
sents the transmission line constraints.
After the economic dispatch is solved, LMP at each bus




lk  Fk l
 !
ð8Þ
where -k is the Lagrange multiplier of (5), and -lk the
Lagrangian multiplier of (7). Note we take -k and -lk as the
Lagrangian multipliers such that we have positive signs
when calculating LMP as shown in (8).
Once the energy market is cleared by ISO, each GENCO
i will be paid according to its LMP and its dispatched
generation. The payoff function for the conventional
GENCO i and the wind GENCO j is given by
Yi ¼ Mi  Gi  ci  Gi ð9Þ
Yj ¼ Mj  Gj  cj  Gj ð10Þ
where Yi, Yj is the profit ($) of conventional GENCO i and
wind GENCO j respectively.
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2.3 Probabilistic model of wind generation output
Wind generation output at a specific time spot is usually
uncertain and cannot be described as a deterministic vari-
able, so it is broadly accepted to use a random variable,
subject to a statistical distribution, to represent it [25].
However, it is difficult to determine the distribution type
due to insufficient historical data. Since wind speed fore-
cast error is usually considered normally distributed and
the wind speed and wind generation output can be con-
sidered linearly correlation in a small region, the wind
generation output is assumed to roughly follow normal
distribution from the viewpoint of the day-ahead operation
[26]. Thus, the wind generation output distribution is given
by
Gj tð ÞN lj tð Þ; rj tð Þ2
 
ð11Þ









U xð Þ ¼
Z x
1
u uð Þdu ð13Þ
where lj(t) is the mean value of Gj(t), rj(t) is the variance
of Gj(t), u(x) is the probability density function (PDF) of
Gj(t), UðxÞ is the cumulative density function (CDF) of
Gj(t).
2.4 Wind generation bidding schemes
From the perspective of the ISO, the increasing penetra-
tion of renewable energy such as wind and solar generation
presents great challenges because of its intermittency and
uncertainty. This makes it harder than conventional gener-
ation to be controlled in practice. For example, in [20], the
wind generation is considered undispatchable and sampled
in different scenarios. For each scenario, it is taken as a
deterministic negative load in the power balance constraint
rather than in the objective function of the economic dispatch
program. The ISO runs security constrained economic dis-
patch to find the output of conventional GENCOs. Finally,
the expectation will be taken to combine the results of all
scenarios together. As a matter of fact, it suffices to consider
wind generation as a zero production cost source. It means
that the wind generation will always be dispatched first
because it often has the lowest production cost in reality. And
this also matches with current practical dispatch policy, i.e.,
to dispatch renewable energy in priority to meet the per-
centage of wind penetration in the renewable portfolio
standards (RPS). This is probably a legitimate model when
the wind generation penetration level in the grid is low and
insignificant.
However, with an increasing penetration of wind gen-
eration integrated into the grid, the above simple treatment
of wind generation as a negative load is likely neither
feasible nor reasonable. Also, this treatment tends to dis-
courage wind power suppliers producing more wind power
or making more profits. Although the advantage of this
dispatch scheme is its easy implementation in practice, this
scheme also excludes wind generation as a bidder in
electric power market. Therefore, in this paper, two
schemes are modeled to consider wind GENCOs as con-
straints (always dispatched first and being price takers) and
as strategic bidders, respectively.
2.4.1 Scheme I: wind generation as constraint in dispatch
Suppose the mean and variance values can be assessed
beforehand. The ISO may use its mean value and its bidding
price to carry out economic dispatch. When wind generation
is considered into this bidding model, it should have some
important adjustment. First, since wind source is intermit-
tent, it is hard to use only one deterministic scenario to rep-
resent its performance. We have to consider its probabilistic
characteristics, i.e., its expectation and variance.
In this paper, a Monte Carlo simulation model, elabo-
rated in the next section, is employed to model the ran-
domness. Suppose we take S samples for wind generation
output Gj(t), and each sampled scenario s has a corre-
sponding probability Ps and a corresponding wind gener-




for probability and lj tð Þ ¼ E Gj tð Þ
  ¼ Gj based on the
proposed assumption.
Based on the previous discussion, for each Monte Carlo
scenario s, the economic dispatch scheme from ISO’s












Gi min Gi s Gi max ð16Þ
Xn
l¼1
Fk l  Gl  Dlð Þ Lk for k ¼ 1; 2;    ; m and all s
ð17Þ
where bi_s is the unknown bidding strategic coefficient
variable of conventional GENCO i in scenario s (it equals
to 1 for non-strategic bidders), Gi_s the scheduled genera-
tion of conventional GENCO i in scenario s (MWh).
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The control variables are bi_s and Gi_s. The difference
between (4) and (14) is that wind generation variables are
removed in (14). In fact, wind power generation cost could be
viewed as zero cost in this case. In addition, the wind gen-
eration capacity constraint is removed in (16), while (15) and
(17) remains the same as (5) and (7). Also,
Pn
l¼1
Dl in (15) and
(17) is the total load subtracts the total wind generation
offset. After this transmission constrained economic dis-
patch process, the LMP calculation still follows (8) and the
payoff function for conventional GENCO i and wind
GENCO j is the same as (9) and (10), respectively. For each
scenario s, the profit of conventional GENCO i is as follows:
Yi s ¼ Mi s  Gi s  ci  Gi s ð18Þ
Since the wind GENCO j is a price-taker in this case, its
profit function at scenario s is calculated as follows:
Yj s ¼ Mj s  Gj s  cj  Gj s ð19Þ
where Yi_s, Yj_s is the profit ($) of conventional GENCO
i or wind GENCO j in scenario s respectively.
Therefore, the whole bidding process can be rewritten as
a bi-level optimization problem as follows:
max
i;s
Yi s ¼ max
i;s
Mi s  Gi s  ci  Gi sð Þ ð20Þ
subject to












Gi min Gi s Gi max ð24Þ
Xn
l¼1
Fkl  Gl  Dlð Þ Lk for k ¼ 1; 2;    ; m and all s
ð25Þ
The control variables are bi_s and Gi_s. The objective
function for a strategic bidder i at scenario s is given by
(20). The first constraint (21) is to set a limitation with bi_s
selection to be realistic; otherwise, the bidder can have
infinite market power in theory.
Thus, the total profit expectation of conventional
GENCO i for all scenarios is calculated as follows:
Yi ¼ E Yi s½  ¼
X
s
Ps  Yi s ð26Þ
And the total profit expectation of wind GENCO j for all
scenarios is calculated as follows:




Ps  Yj s ð27Þ
2.4.2 Scheme II: wind generation as strategic bidder
In this scheme, the randomness of wind power is also
modeled via Monte Carlo simulation. This is the same as in
Scheme I.
The difference is that wind GENCOs are taken as stra-
tegic bidders in this scheme. Since wind generation is not a
constant power source, its payoff function needs to be
modified for each sampled scenario s as follows:
aÞGj [ Gj s
Yj s ¼ Mj s  Gj s  cj  Gj s
þ Mj s Gj s  Gj
  ð28Þ
bÞGj\Gj s
Yj s ¼ Mj s  Gj  cj  Gj s
þ Mj s Gj s  Gj
  ¼ Mj s  Gj s  cj  Gj s
ð29Þ
Next, the objective function in (28) and (29) is
explained. After sampling, it is a deterministic process
for each scenario. At the end of the market clearing process
of the ISO, all LMPs and generation dispatches will be
settled. The wind GENCO will get its revenue as shown by
the first item on the left hand side of (28) and (29). The
second item in (28) and (29) is its production cost.
The third item in (28) is the obligation penalty cost if it
cannot meet the dispatch requirement in day-ahead market
subject to its output uncertainty, because it has to purchase
the gap amount of power from the real-time spot market. If
it has more generation than required in day-ahead market
as in (29), it is assumed to earn extra profits from selling it
to the real-time spot market with the day-ahead price. This
approach represents the penalty or extra profit due to
insufficient or extra output in real-time. Since the goal of
this paper is to compare the two schemes, as long as they
are based on the same assumption (no price difference
between day-ahead and real-time), the comparison is
fair.
Therefore, the whole bidding process can be rewritten as
a bi-level optimization problem shown below:





Mi s  Gi s  ci  Gi sð Þ ð30Þ





Mj s  Gj scj  Gj s





or if it is a wind GENCO with Gj \ Gj_s






Mj s  Gj s








bi s  ci  Gi s þ
XT
j¼Hþ1








Gi min Gi s Gi max; Gj min Gj s Gj max ð36Þ
Xn
l¼1
Fk l  Gl  Dlð Þ Lk for k ¼ 1; 2;    ; m and all s
ð37Þ
The control variables are bi_s, bj_s, Gi_s and Gj_s. If it is a
conventional GENCO, the upper level objective function is
(30), while if it is a wind GENCO, the upper level objective
function should be replaced as (31) and (32) instead. Again,
(33) is to set a limitation with the bi_s and bj_s selections to
avoid the bidder to have infinite market power in theory. In
the lower level optimization, LMP calculation still follows
(8) and the expected payoff function for conventional
GENCO i and wind GENCO j follows (26) and (27)
respectively.
Therefore, its final profit expectation of wind GENCO j
for all wind generation output scenarios is considered as
aÞGj [ Gj s






Mj s  Gj s  cj  Gj s









Ps  Mj s  Gj s  cj  Gj s
  ð39Þ
3 Monte Carlo simulation and genetic algorithm
3.1 Monte Carlo simulation
The Monte Carlo simulation, applicable to both Scheme
I and II, is implemented as follows:
1) The PDFs of wind GENCOs are obtained as the inputs
of the Monte Carlo simulation.
2) Take s repeated random samplings for the PDF of each
wind GENCO j to obtain Gj_s and Ps for each Monte
Carlo sampled scenario s.
3) For each scenario s, perform a deterministic optimi-
zation based on GA and then LP to calculate all
bidding strategies, all GENCO costs, dispatches, all
LMPs, and the profits for all GENCOs (conventional
and wind).
4) Aggregate the results to get the profit expectation of all
GENCOs.
The Monte Carlo simulation will stop when a pre-
defined convergence threshold e has been reached. The
stopping criterion is shown mathematically as follows [27]:
r E Xð Þ½ 
E Xð Þ ¼
r Xð Þﬃﬃ
s
p  E Xð Þ  e ð40Þ
where X is the random variable representing the wind
generation profit, E(X) the mean value of X, and r(X) the
standard deviation of X.
3.2 GA
Essentially, this proposed optimization problem is to
find the global Nash equilibrium to each bidder. The for-
mation of the proposed solution is a bi-level optimization,
which is depicted in Fig 1. There are various approaches to
solve this non-linear, non-convex, bi-level optimization.
Here the GA is used in this paper. Note that the term
‘biological generation’ instead of the commonly used term
‘generation’ in the GA algorithm discussion, is used to
avoid possible confusion with the electrical generation.
Generally, the algorithm terminates when either a
maximum number of generations is reached, or a satis-
factory fitness level has been reached for the population. If
the algorithm is terminated due to a maximum number of
Power pool












Fig. 1 Framework of the proposed bi-level GA optimization process
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Fig. 2 Flowchart of the proposed GA and Monte Carlo simulation for
wind generation bidding scheme I
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All wind GENCO 
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the bidding strategy of
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Fig. 3 Flowchart of the proposed GA and Monte Carlo simulation for
wind generation bidding scheme II
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generations, a satisfactory solution may or may not have
been reached.
By combining the results of all scenarios based on
Monte Carlo simulation and GA, the expected results can
be derived. The flowcharts of Scheme I and II are shown in
Figs. 2–3.
4 Numerical example analysis
The stopping criterion e of Monte Carlo simulation is set
to 0.01 for all cases below [27]. In addition, for the
parameters associated with GA applied to the cases below,
we set the total biological generation to 100, the population
size to 50, crossover rate to 0.5, mutation rate to 0.01, and
eight bits for bidding strategy coefficients (bi and bj). Also,
the GA stopping criterion is that the relative difference
between the previous profit and the current profit of each
GENCO is less than 1% of the current profit for all sce-
narios in each case.
4.1 PJM five bus system
This modified PJM five-bus system is shown in Fig 4
[15]. The transmission line profiles are shown in Table 1.
In the modified system, its total load level is 900 MW. Alta
is a wind generator which observes normal distribution
with a mean output 100 MW and standard variance
16.67 MW. Considering the practical limit of wind output
is three times of standard variance, the wind generation
output will be within the interval [50 MW, 150 MW] with
99.7% confidence based on normal distribution. All other
generators are conventional units, with unit minimum and
maximum generation and cost listed in Table 2 according
to the type of each generator.
4.1.1 Scheme I: wind generation as a constraint
Let Park City and Sundance be the two bidders involved
within this case. The two bidding strategy coefficients for
Park City and Sundance are constrained to be in interval [1,
3] and [1, 1.5], respectively. They may bid up to 45 $/MWh
and 52.5 $/MWh, respectively. Therefore, they have a
wider range to set the price.
Wind generation is considered to be a negative load in
this scheme. 1000 sampling scenarios are taken in this
case. The profit, generation and price expectation for each
generator are shown in Table 3.
The GA convergence rate (i.e., ratio between number of
scenarios converged to a Nash equilibrium and total sce-
narios) is 1. It means that the probability of reaching a
Nash equilibrium solution under current system conditions
is 100%. The average total generation cost of this scheme
is $12959.
4.1.2 Scheme II: wind generation as a bidder
All the assumptions and parameters are the same as in
the previous case in Section 4.1.1. The only difference is
A B C
DE Limit=240 MW
300 MW 300 MW
300 MW







Fig. 4 Modified PJM five-bus system
Table 1 Line impedance and flow limit
Line AB AD AE BC CD DE
X (%) 2.81 3.04 0.64 1.08 2.97 2.97
Limit (MW) 999 999 999 999 999 240




Type Wind Hydro Gas Gas Steam
Pmin (MW) 50 0 0 0 10
Pmax (MW) 150 100 520 300 600
Marginal cost
($/MWh)
7 15 30 35 10




Expected profit ($) 1129 0 0 0 1664
Expected output
(MW)
100 0 212.82 0 587.19
Expected price
($/MW)
18.78 18.78 30 38.56 12.77
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that Alta is also a price bidder of the whole bidding process
at this time with bidding strategic coefficient constrained in
interval [1, 5] such that the wind unit’s bid can be up to 35
$/MWh, which is in a comparable range of the bids of the
other strategic units. Thus, there are three bidders in this
case. The profit expectation is shown in Table 4.
The GA convergence rate in this case is 0.99, i.e. the
probability of reaching a Nash equilibrium solution is 99%
under the current system conditions. The average total
generation cost of this system is $13773, which is about
6.3% higher than the previous case in Section 4.1.1.
4.1.3 Analysis of results with sensitivity study
If we compare the results of the above two cases in
Tables 3 and 4, we can conclude that the profit of wind
generator Alta in the Scheme II is more than in the Scheme
I case even with less expected generation because the profit
gains weight much more than the possible losses when
under-production occurs. This implies that allowing wind
unit to bid may financially help them cover their own
uncertainty and reliability issues. The profit of generator
Solitude is 0, which means the LMP on this bus is always
the same as its marginal cost in both cases. In addition,
generator Park City and Sundance also earn no profit due to
zero production.
However, the generator Brighton is the biggest winner in
Scheme II, because the LMP at its bus doubles and its
expected output stays the same. Also, the total generation
cost goes up by 6.3% which is also significant. Thus, there
are pros and cons for allowing wind generation to partici-
pate in bidding. This implies the need of an update in the
power market architecture and structure for adapting high
penetration of wind generation.
Based on different total system load levels, the sensi-
tivity study is performed. The comparison of the profit of
wind generator Alta and the total cost of the system are
shown in the following figures.
As shown in Figs. 5–6, the load level increases in a
50 MW step. At different load levels, the wind generation
bidder consistently earns in Scheme II more than in
Scheme I, while the total system cost is in Scheme II higher
than in Scheme I as well. At the studied four load levels,
the GA always has a high convergence rate (i.e., ratio
between the number of scenarios converged to a Nash
equilibrium and the total number of scenarios) more than
99.5%, which guarantees the validity of the results.
When the total system load level goes beyond 1100 MW
or even more, the convergence rate of GA is lower than
50%. This means the total generation capacity is not suf-
ficient. Thus, the sensitivity analysis is stopped at
1050 MW load level.
4.2 IEEE 118-bus system
There are 186 branches, 91 loads, and 54 generators in
the IEEE 118-bus test system. All the detailed information
can be found in [28]. The original IEEE 118-bus system
data does not contain the information of generator marginal
costs and branch thermal limits. Therefore, generator
marginal costs are constructed in this paper as follows: 2
wind generators with marginal cost $8, 20 cheap generators
with marginal cost from $10 to $19.5 with $0.5 increment;
18 expensive generators with marginal cost from $20 to
$23 and $26 to $39 with $1 increment; and 14 extremely
expensive generators with marginal cost from $40 to $53
with $1 increment. In addition, five thermal limits are
introduced into the transmission system: 345 MW for lines
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Fig. 6 Comparison of the total cost of the system
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69–77, 630 MW for lines 68–81, 106 MW for lines 83–85
and 94–100, 230 MW for lines 80–98 [26]. Also, the
maximum total generation is more than twice of the total
load. In order to show the efficiency of wind generation,
each load is scaled up at 1.8 times of its original value in
the whole system.
Suppose two wind GENCOs are located at buses 59 and
61, respectively. Their generation output mean values are
155 MW and 160 MW, respectively. Also, they have the
same standard variance at 33.33 MW to make possible
wind generation output in the interval [55 MW, 255 MW]
and [60 MW, 260 MW], respectively, with 99.7% confi-
dence based on the normal distribution property. In addi-
tion, the two wind generations are independent random
variables each other. All other generators are conventional.
4.2.1 Scheme I: wind generation as a constraint
Let generators at buses 65, 66 and 69 be the strategic
players involved in this case. The three bidding strategy
coefficients are constrained to be in interval [1, 2] such that
the involved units may bid up to $56/MWh which gives a
sufficiently wide range for the simulation.
Wind generation is considered to be a negative load in this
scheme with 1000 sampling scenarios. The profit expecta-
tion is shown in Table 5. (Here only the results of the stra-
tegic bidders and wind generator owners are listed).
The GA convergence rate (i.e., ratio between the num-
ber of scenarios converged to a Nash equilibrium and the
total number of scenarios) is 1, which means that the
probability of finding a Nash equilibrium solution is 100%
under the current system conditions. The average genera-
tion cost is $176430.
4.2.2 Scheme II: wind generation as a bidder
All the assumptions and parameters are the same as in
the previous case in 4.2.1. The only difference is that the
two wind units at buses 59 and 61 are market players in the
entire bidding process with the bidding factor in the range
of interval [1, 6]. Thus, we will have five bidders in this
case. Similar to the previous case in 4.2.1, 1000 sampling
scenarios are taken. The profit expectations of five strategic
bidders are shown in Table 6.
The GA convergence rate is 99.5%, which means the
probability of having a Nash equilibrium solution is 99.5%.
The average total generation cost is $178080, which is
about 1% increase from Scheme I. Since the five strategic
bidders represent a small portion of the total units, this 1%
increase is considerable.
4.2.3 Analysis of results
If we compare the results of these two cases in Table 5
and Table 6, the observation shall be very similar to the
one from the previous PJM 5-bus system study. Both wind
generation bidders may have tremendous profit uplift as a
marginal unit even though the probabilistic uncertainty is
considered, because the gains from wind strategic bidding
outweigh the cost of purchasing power due to insufficient
wind production. From this perspective, the renewable
generation will be encouraged to aggressively play in the
power market to gain more profits.
However, also similar to the PJM 5-bus case study, the
above benefit is at the cost of increased total production
cost and more profit of other conventional generation
bidders. Thus, the consumers will pay more.
Therefore, this implies the power market architecture
and structure should be updated to better accommodate
high penetration of wind power. Also, the high GA con-
vergence rate guarantees the validity of the results.
5 Conclusions
The contribution of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
1) Two bidding strategy schemes are modeled in this
paper to consider wind GENCOs, conventional GEN-
COs, and transmission constraints, while few litera-
tures has studied the impact of wind GENCOs to
bidding strategy. The first scheme considers wind
power as negative loads, which is aligned with the
ongoing practice that wind generation must be
dispatched with higher priority. The second scheme
regards wind GENCOs as possible strategic bidders,
Table 5 Profit expectation for each generator
Generator at bus 59 61 65 66 69
Expected profit ($) 4577.4 4727.9 5354.8 4839.9 6981.7
Expected output
(MW)
153.74 158.66 490.9 491 794.75
Expected price
($/MW)
37.85 37.87 37.9 37.86 37.84
Table 6 Profit expectation for each generator
Generator at bus 59 61 65 66 69
Expected profit ($) 4838.5 4952.5 5826.4 5328.9 7876.7
Expected output
(MW)
108.04 115.36 491 491.51 801.91
Expected price
($/MW)
38.84 38.85 38.87 38.84 38.83
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which is aligned with the common expectation that
wind power owners may participate in market com-
petition in the future.
2) In each scheme, a comprehensive bidding strategy
model is proposed in a probabilistic approach using
Monte Carlo simulation. In each Monte Carlo sample,
a bi-level optimization model is employed with
different objective functions for wind GENCOs. The
GA is employed as the solution method.
3) Simulation results show that, when wind GENCOs
play as strategic bidders to set the price, they can make
significant profit gains as opposed to playing as a price
taker. Note this result considers the probabilistic
variability of wind generation output. However, this
is at the cost of increased production cost and the profit
of other generators, which means the consumers will
pay more. Thus, we can draw an important conclusion
that when there is a high-penetration of wind gener-
ation, it is very necessary to update the existing market
architecture in terms of competitive electricity market
for high-penetration renewables.
The future work may include the bidding strategy model
with ancillary service models, detailed penalty model and
the effect of GENCO’s collusion and coalition in the power
electricity market.
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